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[At the London zoo] the keeper showed [Jenny, an orangutan] an apple,
but would not give it her, whereupon she threw herself on her back,
kicked & cried, precisely like a naughty child.–She then looked very sulky
& after two or three ﬁts of pashion, the keeper said, “Jenny if you will stop
bawling & be a good girl, I will give you the apple.”– She certainly
understood every word of this, &, though like a child, she had great
work to stop whining, she at last succeeded, & then got the apple, with
which she jumped into an arm chair & began eating it, with the most
contented countenance imaginable.
Charles Darwin, letter to Miss Susan Darwin, March 1838 (Darwin &
Barlow, 1946)
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3.1 Introduction: What’s It Like to Be a Pig?
Is Darwin right? Is Jenny the orangutan “precisely like” a naughty child?
Can a nonhuman animal sulk, understand admonishments, and learn to
control her emotions? Some biologists (Bateson, 2003) and philosophers
(Griﬃths, 1997) hypothesize that the behaviors of great apes have
homologies with the behaviors of Homo sapiens, but this seems not to
be Darwin’s claim. Darwin’s claim seems more radical: the mental,
experiential, states of the orangutan and the child are the same. Should
we believe Darwin about orangutans? And, if we should, what should we
think about the mental states of our so-called food animals? Intuitively,
Jenny seems to have more of what it takes to be a person than does, say, a
pig. Even if Darwin is right about orangutans—they are like children—
what about hogs and cows? Are the nonhuman animals we eat like
children?
To answer these questions we must deﬁne persons, see to what extent
the great apes qualify, and ask to what extent other mammals qualify.
What are persons? Do rights attach only to persons? Might individuals
with less-than-personhood status deserve the special protections rights
aﬀord? In his book, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition, Gary
Varner provides nuanced and scientiﬁcally informed answers to these
questions (Varner, 2012). I ﬁnd his interpretations of the range and
diversity of nonhuman animal consciousness compelling and will lean
heavily on them in what follows. Varner understands and successfully
eludes the two main interpretive mistakes: anthropomorphism, or
ascribing human characteristics to nonhuman animals who lack them,
and anthropodenial (de Waal, 1999), not ascribing human characteris-
tics to beings who have them.1
1Over- and under-interpreting the data are only two of the most visible pitfalls. Science itself can
be misleading if we naively assume that it will tell us all we need to know. As Tom Nagel famously
observed, reductive physicalist accounts of, say, bat consciousness may explain and predict bat
behavior but they may not be of any help whatsoever with our question, that is, what is a bat’s
internal subjective experience like (Nagel, 1974)? That said, science is critical for our task, in
which we must triangulate three sources of information: systematic accounts of animal anatomical






































Here is my strategy in this chapter. I intend to show that it is not
diﬃcult to enter other mammals’ minds if we select the right kinds of
human experiences as analogues. For nearly all humans have some of the
same experiences as some other mammals. As my test case of other
mammals I select pigs because they are the mammalian species slaugh-
tered in the United States in the largest numbers.2 I wager that if fair-
minded observers come to understand what pig consciousness is like,
they will also come to acknowledge the rights not only of pigs but of all
individuals I call “far-persons.”
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to mount a thorough defense of
my claim. Here, I will only describe what a human far-person is and
suggest that their mental states are a stepping stone to the mental states
of other animals. I agree with Temple Grandin, the Colorado State
University animal science professor, when she writes that humans with
mental limitations such as autism—a disorder with which she copes—
are “a kind of way station on the road from animals to humans”
(Grandin, 2005).
3.2 Persons
Varner deﬁnes a person as an individual with a biographical sense of self
and, following a well-developed philosophical tradition, argues that
individuals of this sort deserve special treatment. The concept of a
person, then, has two components, normative and descriptive.
Normatively, persons are individuals who have achieved a certain
kind of status and, for this reason, they must be treated in particular
ways. In ordinary moral discourse, we express a person’s status by saying
that she has rights, valid claims to protection from being used by others,
renditions of how it may feel to be the animal in question (cf. Akins, 1993). This is the project I
pursue here, however sketchily.
2 According to the United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics
Service, US slaughterhouses killed 38,399,000 hogs in 2015. Of other mammals, cattle were







































claims that should rarely be denied. According to two-level utilitarian-
ism, the ethical theory Varner defends, “rights” are important concepts
in ordinary moral discourse and indispensable to what Varner calls the
Intuitive Level System (ILS).3
What capacities must someone have to be a person? Descriptively, a
person is an autobiographical being, an individual who understands the
serial progression of her experiences as a temporal whole. This narrative
self-understanding is active as well as passive, for persons can shape their
lives into the kind of life they want it to be. To have a biological sense of
self, an individual must be “rational and self-conscious, autonomous in the
sense of having second-order desires, and a moral agent” (Varner, 2012).
Varner argues that existing evidence from animal studies suggests that no
nonhuman animals have these capacities. He cautions us that not all of the
evidence is in yet, and that we should not be surprised if future scientiﬁc
discoveries cause us to change our minds. In the meantime, he continues,
there are reasons to be skeptical that any nonhuman animals will be found to
have “narrative self-constitution” (Schechtman, 1996). For being a person
means not only that I have desires and understand myself as having a story I
am living out in pursuit of those desires. It also means that I have desires
about my desires and understand myself to be crafting a story—my story—
for myself. In this way I am not what Harry Frankfurt calls a “wanton,” a
cognitively limited human being without preferences about one’s preferences
and, so, no ability to rank them (Frankfurt, 1971). Unlike wantons, persons
care about what sort of person they are, and about what others think of
them. Persons perceive gaps between their present selves and their ideal
selves, and we occasionally try to elevate our wants and desires to match our
ideal wants and desires.
To live as an active “narrating” self I must be rational, autonomous,
and self-conscious. One way to understand this claim, a way not
3 ILS rules are the rules we ought to adopt to govern our everyday behavior. The ILS system diﬀers
from what Varner, following R. M. Hare, calls the critical level, the set of rules and principles we
adopt when we have the time and resources actually to try to maximize the good. When thinking
critically, we may realize that, in extremely rare situations, achieving the overall good might
require us to violate rights. The details of two-level utilitarianism are beyond the scope of our







































inconsistent with Varner’s view, I think, is to focus on the relationship
between narrative, language, and time. Narratives are made of proposi-
tions and propositions are made of words. It takes more time to form
and understand a proposition than it takes to form or understand a
word, and more time still to understand a narrative.
Words can be used to name objects, and such nouns can in turn be
conjoined with verbs to form phrases. The order of the words can
be changed to change the meaning of the phrase, and new phrases can
be inserted into other phrases to form sentences. Sentences can be strung
together into narratives which invariably have plots. Without the ability
to think in plots, I arguably do not have suﬃciently developed linguistic
tools to understand the nuanced interplay of temporal sequences
necessary for another capacity. The capacity to be a moral agent requires
that I understand the plot in which my decisions conﬂict with other
characters’ decisions in scenes that involve our mutual entitlements and
responsibilities. Plots emerge when persons threaten each other and
when we must respond to such threats—cooperatively or agonistically.
Suppose, as seems true, that children take many years to acquire the
complex linguistic skills necessary for narrative self-constitution.
Suppose that only animals with large brains living in complex social
networks are capable of evolving to the point where language teachers
will devote years of their lives to developing the ability of the young
narratively to constitute themselves. If these are the facts about what it
takes to produce a person, it is unlikely that we will discover any
nonhuman animals outside the sphere of human culture with a biogra-
phical sense of self.
So neither orangutans nor pigs, it seems, can be persons if persons
come into being only as individuals grasp the fact that other individuals
are, like them, conscious moral agents capable of shaping their own
biographies. For to grasp this fact, a person needs a theory of their own
mind that provides the story by which they form the desire to have
correct, just, right desires, desires that properly guide their treatment of
others. Persons are oriented, therefore, by the past, that is, by their
conscious memories of how they have acted, morally and immorally.
Such memories imbue a person’s present with a valence that orients






































Without a conscious past, an individual has no impetus. But without
a conscious future, one has no trajectory. If pigs have only procedural,
habitual, memories, they do not have the kinds of cognitive resources
necessary to understand where they are, psychologically speaking, much
less form a picture of where they want to go. If pigs do not consciously
remember where and when speciﬁc events occurred or what and why
they behaved in certain ways toward other pigs, they cannot access their
past in the way required to adjust their behaviors to their ideals in the
future. They cannot, if this account is correct, deliberate, for example,
about the implications of their past conﬂicts with other pigs. Nor can
they try out alternative hypotheses about how they should act toward an
agonistic conspeciﬁc in the future in order to rectify past wrongs or
prevent future trouble. If pigs lack episodic memory and executive
control of desires, they do not have the kind of agency necessary to
have a future of their own.
How would we know if a nonhuman animal were an autonomous
agent capable of reﬂecting on her past, examining her motives and
intentions, and making future decisions in line with her values and
ideals? Varner suggests some empirical measures; the mark test as a
way of assessing self-recognition, story-telling about one’s past as a test
for episodic memory, caching food for future use as a sign of future
planning, and deception of conspeciﬁcs as a harbinger of theory of mind.
Before we look at the evidence in each of these areas, let us say a further
word about theory of mind, the ability to understand others’ behaviors
as motivated by their mental states.
Having an understanding of my own mind goes hand in hand with
having a theory of others’ minds, especially if the ability to understand
the behavior of others as motivated by their mental states is a corequisite
for understanding my own behavior as motivated by my mental states
(cf. Carruthers, 2011). If a person’s life has a narrative trajectory that
gets its direction from conscious awareness of one’s past and future, and
this self-conscious narrative trajectory is itself dependent upon under-
standing the lives of others as having a similar narrative structure, then
the self-conscious capacity to think of oneself as a character in a story,
made possible by the mind-reading capacity to think of others as






































The normative features of personhood arise with the appearance of
theory of mind. For the trajectory of a person’s life is aimed by them at
goals they establish. It is the basis, too, of their personal understanding of
what a good life is for them. To this extent, we are in control of our own
behavior—or, at least, it certainly feels that we are. Whether we in fact
have free will is immaterial to the pain we feel when others interfere with
our plans or in other ways frustrate us in our pursuit of our goals. Being
bound physically or psychologically against our will is, all else equal, a
form of enslavement. Enslaving someone is prima facie wrong for many
reasons, including that it violates their autonomy. To live a good life,
agents who feel they are free should be allowed to think freely and to make
decisions for themselves. For when others seek to control my thoughts and
actions, they diminish my happiness and violate my right to liberty.
Individuals who do not experience the kind of freedom that comes
with a biographical sense of self cannot be disrespected in the same way
that persons can be disrespected. For if one never has the feeling of
freedom, how can one feel its loss? If pigs do not aspire to live according
to certain ideals the reason may be that they do not have the capacity to
exercise executive control over their behavior. If pigs cannot choose to
inhibit lesser desires in order to satisfy more important desires, they
cannot choose, either, to govern their behavior according to their ideals.
In sum, persons have a biographical sense of self. They are rational and
self-conscious, have desires about desires, and feel that they can act freely
as moral agents. The mental tools necessary to constitute oneself narra-
tively are concepts and words, phrases, and propositions used to describe
good and bad characters and desirable and undesirable plots. Because
persons have the feelings of freedom, they are morally responsible for their
actions. For all of these reasons, persons are entitled to special protections.
3.3 Near-Persons
Individuals who lack a biographical sense of self but have what Varner calls
a “robust autonoetic consciousness” cannot narratively self-constitute






































personal goals, and the feelings of being free to shape their narrative.
However, because they have a rich, deep sense of the recent past and
because they have procedural memories and facial recognition, they can
become conscious of themselves and others. They are capable of learning
how to perform new tasks, of taking pleasure in their successes in this area,
and capable of making plans for the intermediate future. By “intermediate
future” I mean, roughly, the rest of today and, a bit more precisely, a future
that stretches out as long as a few dozen minutes and perhaps a few hours,
but not beyond the onset of the next sleep-cycle.
Robust autonoetic consciousness requires that an individual possess
some of a person’s cognitive capacities, including the ability to
understand concepts and to interpret others’ bodily gestures and
vocalizations as meaningful signs, that is, words or directives.
Words are sounds emitted by a sender who uses the representation
to designate objects to a receiver. Directives are sounds used to
request or demand speciﬁc responses. Near-persons understand repre-
sentation and causality. What they do not understand are proposi-
tional attitudes, the linking of nouns and verbs to form grammatical
phrases. Grammar allows us to form novel propositions by doing
nothing more than recursively changing the order of words and
phrases. Recursion allows us to embed phrases within phrases, and
other phrases within those phrases—and so on, and so on—almost
without end. With words, phrases, and propositions, one can create
narrative plots full of characters enacting what Aristotle called
“drama.” Plots, moral agency, and characters all become possible
with narrative, but only with narrative. Without plots and characters,
with only the lower-level cognitive resources of words and rudimen-
tary grammar, the possibility of an animal narratively constituting
itself disappears. Only autonoetic consciousness remains.
Varner reviews the evidence about nonhuman animals’ use of lan-
guage and concludes that no nonhuman animals have the ability to
understand propositions, much less conjoin them into narratives. It is
clear, however, to me at least, that many pigs as well as orangutans
understand gestures and vocalizations as full-blown representations, that
is, concepts and, further, as words and directives. I employ those two






































I commit any anthropomorphizing mistake in using them. For while
nonhuman animals apparently lack a full-blown biographical sense of
self and are not characters, they need not have narrative in order to have
exactly the same semantic resources possessed by human near-persons.
When a vervet monkey vocally signals to another the presence of a
speciﬁc predator, such as a leopard (or eagle, or snake), the monkey is
using a word with pragmatic force (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012). It is,
literally, issuing a warning using a word that, translated into English,
would be something like “leopard!” (or eagle! or snake!).
Some nonhuman animals also seem to perceive, understand, and
represent their bodies as their own and so to be self-conscious.
Individuals who pass the mark test (by wiping away a mark on
their face when seen in a mirror) seemingly must have a memory
of what their body looks like and the thought, “that image in the
mirror is my face.” For if they see a strange mark on their forehead
and try to remove it, they must have not only a procedural, habitual
memory of how to wipe their forehead but an episodic memory as
well of how their face is supposed to appear. “My face is not
supposed to look like that face.” And it would seem they must
further have some anticipation about how their face will look again
in the near-term future after they have wiped the mark away. “Soon
the image in the mirror will look like me again.”
All of these claims about the capacities of some mammals (in this case,
great apes) are consistent with the claim those animals have a robust
proprioceptive sense of their bodies, an intermediate past, and an inter-
mediate future. But these capacities are a far cry from propositional
knowledge, long-term temporal horizons extending beyond the next few
hours, executive control of one’s behavior, narrative understanding and
creativity, and moral agency. A chimp may desire to wash her face now
but she does not want, for all we know, to clean up her social image
starting ﬁrst thing next week.
Orangutan Jenny doubtless has several stories that could be told about
her life, but every such story will be the creation of a human person. Her
life goes well or poorly for her and she has a welfare that can be promoted
or undermined. But if, as I assume, orangutans lack second-order desires,






































she would prefer to pursue. Nor does she have preferences about which
sort of reputation she would like to have among her peers if she cannot
entertain various visions of the good life or freely choose to pursue one
ideal self over another. Consequently, Jenny does not and cannot tell
herself or others the story of her life.
Which nonhuman animals may be near-persons like Jenny? Reviewing
the evidence, Varner argues that the category includes great apes, cetaceans,
elephants, and, perhaps, corvids and parrots. To defend his claim that great
apes do not have the kind of episodic memory required to have a biogra-
phical sense of one’s past, he examines the evidence provided for believing
that Koko, the gorilla, has narrative and uses it to communicate deeply
emotional personal memories from the distant past.
Koko was ﬁve years old in July, 1976. According to Francine
“Penny” Patterson, who worked more closely with Koko than anyone,
in 1976 Koko narrated an event that had happened three days prior:
(P = Patterson; K = Koko)
P: What did you do to Penny?
K: BITE.
P: You admit it? (Koko had earlier called the bite a SCRATCH.)
K: SORRY BITE SCRATCH.






(Patterson & Cohn, 1994, p.282)
Koko’s one and two word responses here, drawn from her knowledge of
more than a thousand American Sign Language (ASL) signs, clearly show
an understanding of concepts, words, and causal relations (What did you
do to Penny? BITE). However, as Varner notes, there is no evidence here
of episodic memory, in which one remembers oneself at a particular place
at a particular time. Koko is using ASL which, Varner tells us, does not






































generally be inferred from the context, and in these studies, that context is
provided by the English sentences uttered by the human trainers” (Varner,
2012, p.155). Varner has his doubts about whether Koko is here commu-
nicating a conscious memory of what happened three days ago. Rather,
Koko may simply be making signs she knows will succeed in eliciting the
responses Koko desires from Patterson.
But if Koko is not capable of expressing memories of events three days
in the past, she is able to communicate her emotions. When asked,
“How do you feel?” she will respond appropriately, for example, with
FINE, or HUNGRY, or SAD. In children, internal immediate-state
language reporting one’s mood emerges in the third and fourth years.
We are on ﬁrm ground, then, in thinking Koko has words and concepts,
social communication, rationality in the sense of cause and eﬀect think-
ing, emotions, awareness, and beliefs and desires. But she does not seem
to have the second-order desires, executive control, or autonomy
required for a biographical sense of self.
Varner is similarly cautious about long-term memories allegedly
recounted by a gorilla, Michael, who was captured by poachers as an
infant. Patterson made a video of Michael allegedly recounting this
memory of the incident in which Michael’s mother was killed. In the
recording we see Michael’s signings rendered in the following captions
provided by Patterson: “SQUASH MEAT GORILLA. MOUTH
TOOTH. CRY SHARP-NOISE LOUD. BAD THINK-TROUBLE
LOCK-FACE. CUT/NECK LIP(GIRL) HOLD” (The Gorilla
Foundation, n.d.). Varner, noting the ambiguity of the string of words,
observes that “even Patterson’s sympathetic co-author Eugene Linden
doubts her claim that Michael was telling the story about his mother’s
death” (Ibid, pp.155–156). Varner concludes that in spite of such anec-
dotes and Patterson’s claim that Michael told her this story on several
occasions, there is “no good evidence that apes understand or use lan-
guage to express thoughts about the non-immediate past” (Ibid, pp.156).
If Varner is wrong and Michael is recounting an episodic memory,
Michael has an important claim to personhood. If Varner is right,
perhaps Michael is just making signs he thinks Patterson is subcon-
sciously nudging him to make, perhaps in Clever Hans fashion. In that






































Rather, he may only be signing in sequences he has learned satisfy
Patterson’s promptings.
In sum, near-persons are sentient, rational beings with a clear sense of
the world around them. They learn from their experiences and are con-
scious of events in the intermediate past. They can make plans concerning
the intermediate future. But they lack what persons have, a full-featured
biographical sense of self. Near-persons do not have second-order desires
about their desires, episodic memories, or plans for tomorrow. They do not
have a theory of mind, cannot tell others stories about themselves, and
cannot shape their lives in accordance with their values.
3.4 The Merely Sentient
Varner’s “merely sentient” nonhuman animals are individuals who live
entirely in the moment. Attracted to favorable stimuli and repulsed from
aversive stimuli, the merely sentient are neither able to exercise control
over the external forces that move them around in the world nor are they
conscious of those forces. The merely sentient do not have emotions,
rationality, or a robust sense of the world around them. They do not
learn from their experiences, recognize the faces of conspeciﬁcs, or
engage in social communication.
Which nonhuman animals are merely sentient? Whether ﬁsh feel
pains and pleasures is a matter of some dispute but assuming that ﬁsh
are sentient, this capacity may be the full extent of their mental powers.
In his earlier book, In Nature’s Interests?, Varner observes that ﬁsh fail
tests of conscious problem solving, such as multiple reversal trials, and
suggests that if they learn from memories at all they learn only implicitly
and subconsciously (Varner, 1998). If ﬁsh feel pain but have only the
vaguest sense of immediate past events and an even less explicit and
shorter view of the future, ﬁsh are merely sentient.
What is it like to be merely sentient? Can one think about one’s future
at all? Here is what Varner writes:
The merely sentient may experience a sense of ease based on what






































call ‘implicit anticipation.’ An implicit memory is one that aﬀects one’s
choices, but without being available for conscious recall. (Varner, 2012,
p.162)
Squirrels, Varner claims, do not plan for the future, have episodic mem-
ories, narrative autobiographies, or theory of mind. They are not persons.
But neither, Varner surmises, are they near-persons because there is no
evidence that they recognize themselves in mirrors, have personally
indexed memories, or plan for the future. They have implicit memories
and implicit anticipations, but these capacities are not suﬃcient to form
conscious plans for the future. A squirrel hoarding acorns consciously
desires “to get each acorn into its stash” but “is completely unconscious of
the purpose of its hoarding behavior” (Ibid, p.164). Since, Varner con-
tinues, the squirrel is not aware of the reason for its behavior, or of the
long-term beneﬁts of stashing, the animal consequently:
…can achieve no sense of satisfaction when it has stashed enough acorns.
It cannot, in eﬀect, say “There, I’ve accomplished that! Since that (the goal
of laying up enough acorns for the winter) is something of which it is not
conscious.” (Ibid)
Varner allows that the squirrel can “achieve a sense of satisfaction” from
getting an acorn into her stash. Squirrels have simple desires (“get this
acorn into that hole”) and simple beliefs about cause and eﬀect (“drop-
ping this object into that gash will get this acorn into that hole”). But
Varner does not allow, nor does it seem true, that the squirrel can get
satisfaction from having put in an honest day’s labor, as it were. If the
squirrel does not possess the intermediate-level concepts of “a day’s
work” or “the cold season”—much less the higher-level concepts and
grammar necessary to form propositions (“If I fail to put in a suﬃcient
number of good days of work I will run out of acorns and face
catastrophe in the cold season to come”)—the squirrel cannot have the
narrative knowledge required to constitute herself as a subject who
endures across a series of temporally discrete events. Given what we
now know about squirrels, it seems right to say that they are not capable






































To summarize, the merely sentient feel pain and pleasure but lack
the ability to reﬂect on them. Their temporal horizons stretch out-
ward from the present, but no further into the past than a few
seconds and hardly, if at all, into the future. They lack a robust
autonoetic consciousness.
3.5 The Problem, Restated: Are Pigs Merely
Sentient?
Varner suggests that while we presently do not have evidence for
autonoetic consciousness in any nonhumans other than the candidates
for near-personhood, such evidence may be forthcoming as we become
more skilled at testing for the target capacities. Meanwhile, he points
out, we must make policies regarding the so-called food animals. He
suggests that we adopt what he calls the “Rumsfeld response,” namely,
that we do the best we can, forming regulations based on the evidence
we have rather than the evidence we wish we had. By implication, then,
since there are only two categories available, near-persons and merely
sentient, Varner’s framework would categorize pigs as merely sentient.
At least for the moment. And, at least for the moment, this under-
standing of pig consciousness would allow the killing of pigs for food
since the value of a pig would, in Peter Singer’s word, be replaceable
(Singer, 1993). As long as one merely sentient animal is brought into the
world every time one like it is dispatched, overall value is conserved.
Varner does not claim that pigs are merely sentient, but he ﬁnds no
experimental evidence to date that pigs pass the mark test, attribute false
beliefs to conspeciﬁcs, communicate to each other about their plans, and
so on. A positive case for the conclusion that pigs are merely sentient and
replaceable can be found in the kinds of arguments made by Donald
Davidson and R. G. Frey, arguments that coincide with Varner’s
assumptions about squirrels, that the animals lack intermediate- and
higher-level concepts such as “a day’s work,” “the young ones to be born
tomorrow,” and “putting in a good day’s work preparing for the births






































concepts it is probably because they lack the linguistic capacity to form
the phrases necessary to have the concepts in question. Lacking grammar
and propositions, a sow cannot have a sense of satisfaction in reviewing
her day’s activities. Nor can she take pleasure in the fact that she has, for
example, “built an enviable nest in preparation for the piglets,” even
though this is precisely what she has done.
Why can’t she take such pleasure? Because her implicit memories and
implicit anticipations are neither temporally extended in the way
required nor is she capable of hooking them consciously together into
a narrative. Neither are they pegged by the pig to herself. Consider a
free-range sow, Oreo, building her nest (HeatherF27, 2007). Oreo
apparently does not consciously plan for the future birth of her oﬀspring
even as she aims to get this mouthful of straw into the place she thinks it
ought to go. For she is not conscious of the purpose of her movements in
serially taking mouthful after mouthful of straw and placing them in a
large pile. If this is the right description of how it feels to be a pig making
a nest, as I believe it is, the sow is conscious of goals she aims to achieve
in the next few dozen minutes but not conscious of any overarching goal
she may achieve by successfully completing a series of such acts. Oreo
can achieve satisfaction from successful completion of the proper place-
ment of this mouthful of straw but not from successful completion of
behaviors we would call, were they performed by a woman, maternal
activities in preparation for tomorrow’s births. To paraphrase Varner, a
sow cannot, in eﬀect, say, “There, I’ve accomplished that!” since that
(the goal of preparing a warm nest in preparation for partuition) is
something of which the sow is not conscious (cf. Varner, 2012,
p.164). If all of this is correct, how it feels to be a squirrel or pig
would be the same as how it feels to be a ﬁsh.
But is this correct? Isn’t the nest building behavior itself evidence that
Oreo has intermediate-term beliefs and desires? For it is essential to our
description of her behavior that she is building a nest, an activity that
takes hours to complete. Given her behavior, mustn’t we allow that the
sow has temporal horizons of a suﬃcient length and complexity to
achieve this end? Her fussing with various conﬁgurations of the straw,
hour after hour, strongly suggests she is making judgments about how






































after mouthful of straw and randomly place one here and another there.
Nor does she suspend operations after a few minutes, turning her
attention to other matters. If she behaved in this way, we might think
she was not building a nest. Were she to spend every waking hour
moving straw hither and yon, all day long whether pregnant or not,
we might think her a wanton who knows not what she does.
But these are not proper descriptions of Oreo’s behavior. First, she
is pregnant; there is a reason for her behavior. Second, she pursues
her straw moving behavior all morning. Third, she is free to stop and
start as she wishes; she is neither playing around aimlessly nor
anxiously pacing stereotypically. Fourth, she does not cease what
she is doing until a structure suﬃcient to warm her coming oﬀspring
is in place. The evidence is that Oreo has in mind a project that will
take her many minutes, perhaps hours, to ﬁnish. And this is evidence
that points to an important diﬀerence between porcine and ﬁsh
consciousness. I can think of no clearer way to put the diﬀerence
than in temporal terms. Whereas the “temporal window” of some
ﬁsh is, according to some observers, conﬁned to a few seconds, the
temporal window of the pig stretches out for many minutes, perhaps
as far as an hour. At the beginning of her work, Oreo initiates a
project that she cannot accomplish now. And to make good decisions
about which step to take next, she must represent what she has built
so that she can compare it with the image of what she intends to
build. The structure she foresees will require for its completion
dozens of minutes of activity on her part, activity of which she is
conscious. Or so the evidence would suggest.
Hold on, one may object. The argument thus far has been based on
anecdotal evidence and arm-chair philosophy. Fair enough. Let us con-
sider a controlled experiment.
In a maze test conducted with two sows who forage together on a
daily basis, researchers placed two buckets behind a series of barriers
(Mendl, et al., 2010). Only one bucket contained food. One pig, whom
I will call Informed, was allowed to search the arena to ﬁnd which
bucket had the goods. She was then removed from the pen. Soon
thereafter the arena was reopened and Informed was allowed back in.






































mate Uninformed. The researchers’ ﬁrst question was, Can Uninformed
ﬁgure out that Informed knows where the food is and exploit that
knowledge in her attempt to eat? The answer is yes. The naïve animal
followed the smaller animal, apparently intuiting both that (a) Informed
was hungry, and (b) Informed knew where the reward was located.
The researchers discovered something else. After several iterations of
the trial, Informed began to exhibit behaviors suggesting that she was
reading Uninformed’s mind. Upon entering the arena, Informed resisted
the impulse to head straight for the food. She took a meandering path
and did not head straightaway for the bucket. Was she trying to throw
oﬀ her heavier mate? There is no other plausible explanation. Whereas
Informed would initially go straight to the food, soon she began secretive
maneuvers. She’d move ﬁrst behind a barrier and, keeping a steady eye
on her mate, wait until Uninformed was out of sight. She would then,
and only then, dart for the food.
Does Informed have the discriminative ability to see the world from
Uninformed’s perspective? Are her deceptive movements’ evidence that
she can shift her point of view to another pig’s point of view? Clearly
Informed is inquisitive and attentive, conscious of her surroundings, and
able to learn the locations of objects. But she may also be suppressing a
strong desire to eat believing that doing so will allow her, in the long
run, to get more food. If this is what she is doing, then Informed is
consciously foreseeing the future, traveling mentally forward in time,
imagining herself alone at the trough. She is also rank ordering her
preferences, exercising executive control of the desires on which she
chooses to act. If she has these capacities, she may be thinking the
equivalent of “I must move my body over in this direction, watch for
my opportunity, and then run quickly to the bucket.” And if she has
these capacities, she is capable of seeing two possible future scenarios—
one in which she is alone with the reward, one in which she is accom-
panied by Uninformed. She is also capable of consciously choosing the
future scenario she most desires, and she is capable of purposely con-
trolling her emotions in order to achieve it. On this interpretation,
Informed has the abilities to form hypotheses about how to achieve
her goals, consciously to decide on the path she thinks most likely to






































another pig’s mind, and act on the preference she has given highest
priority. Can Informed think these thoughts?
I doubt it. The current evidence does not support such a conclu-
sion. While we might understand a person’s analogous behavior as
motivated by the kinds of cognitive states just described, we have
little evidence at present to think that Informed has the ability to
understand other pigs’ behaviors as motivated by mental states. In
the absence of such evidence, the anthropomorphizing dimensions of
the interpretation are unwarranted. If we assume Morgan’s Canon,
as we should, we must prefer simpler, lower-level explanations over
more complicated explanations. The rule is only to attribute addi-
tional, higher-level, second-order psychological capacities when no
suﬃcient lower-level explanations are available (Karin-D’Arcy, 2005;
Morgan, 1903). However, in the food-seeking behavior, one can
explain the pig’s movements in terms of ﬁrst-order weak and strong
beliefs and desires (Carruthers, 2008). For Informed has two con-
ﬂicting desires: a desire to eat now while sharing with a mate, and a
stronger desire to eat later while not sharing with a mate. Informed
has two consistent beliefs: a strong belief that if she runs directly to
the food she will have to share it, and a strong belief that if she ﬁrst
deceives her mate she will not have to share it. So, given her beliefs
and her strongest desire, she acts on the stronger desire.
We need not attribute a theory of mind to Informed to explain her
behaviors because her behaviors can each be explained in terms of
“world-directed” beliefs. World-directed beliefs are beliefs about objects
in the world as opposed to subject-directed beliefs, which are beliefs
about subjects—other minds or persons. Nor need we postulate that
Informed has the capacity for executive control of her preferences
because the ﬁrst-order, world-directed interpretation just oﬀered will
suﬃce to explain her movements. Informed forms one association over
the course of several trials that if food is in location X and no other pigs
are in the arena, the best course of action is Y, to run straight to the food.
She forms a second association that if food is in location X and other pigs
are in the arena, the best course of action is Z, to meander away from the
food, to monitor the other pig’s location and when its head is positioned






































behavior is causally determined by whichever set of environmental
conditions obtains.
A deﬂationary interpretation of Informed’s behavior inspired by
Morgan’s Canon undermines the claim that she has all of the psycho-
logical capacities of a near-person. But it does not undermine the claim
that she has some of a near-person’s cognitive skills. To the contrary, it is
accurate to say that Informed feels hungry, desires to try to lose her mate,
and believes that moving away from the food will buy her precious
competitor-free seconds at the trough. While the sow does not have
robust autonoetic consciousness, however, she has more than mere
sentience. She is able to formulate hypotheses, hold them in mind,
and choose among them. She is able to defer acting on immediate
desires to make possible the satisfaction of longer-term desires.
With respect to its duration, mammalian consciousness is unlike ﬁsh
consciousness. First, unlike ﬁsh, pigs and squirrels have conceptual repre-
sentations of objects such as acorns and sheaves of straw. Second, they have
the short-term projects of getting this acorn into her stash and placing this
sheaf of straw in an advantageous position. Third, they can recognize faces
and respond to others. They have basic social emotions such as happiness
and sadness. Fourth, they have basic communicative mechanisms they can
consciously deploy to alert and inform conspeciﬁcs of dangers and oppor-
tunities. Fifth, they can use their communicative mechanisms to deceive
others. Sixth, they can learn to maximize rewards by systematically mirror-
ing the choice that was rewarded on the just-completed trial (Varner,
1998). As these capacities are not available to the merely sentient, we
need a new category to represent these nonhuman animals.
3.6 Far-Persons
A far-person is an individual with non-narrative experience, or what I
will call “lyrical” experience. A lyrical experience has a short duration
with a “minute” temporal horizon stretching no more than an hour or
two into the past and several minutes into the future. Lyrical experiences






































experiences can also be intense, concentrated, powerful. The “of the
moment” experiences of far-persons can be profoundly pleasurable and
horrifyingly painful. But they are not foreseen and their after-eﬀects do
not persist in conscious memory. Far-persons cannot recall their experi-
ences later. They cannot organize their lives so as to produce more
pleasurable experiences or fewer painful experiences.
Lyrical experiences do not involve episodic memories or episodic
anticipations. They do require the ability to become habituated to new
circumstances, to learn new skills, and to develop novel beliefs and
desires based on implicit memories. On the basis of such unconscious
psychological capacities, individuals can form conscious hypotheses and
set goals for the short-term future. Lyrical experiences are laden with
value and often involve the so-called four basic emotions: happiness,
sadness, anger, and fear or surprise (Jack, et al., 2014). Finally, lyrical
experiences involve awareness of one’s achievement; far-persons can take
pride in their successes and be frustrated by their failures.
Like near-persons, far-persons are sentient and conscious. They have
beliefs, desires, and emotions. They understand causal relations and can
reason about the best ways to achieve their objectives. They have a point of
view; they can remember the faces of their conspeciﬁcs and what those
conspeciﬁcswere doing aminute or two ago.However, unlike near–persons,
far-persons lack a robust autonoetic consciousness. They cannot see their
bodies from another’s perspective, do not have desires about their desires, and
lack temporal horizons stretching beyond the present hour or two.
A far-person’s memory cannot index one’s self to yesterday, placing
one’s body in relation to temporally-ordered events or use the past as the
basis for tomorrow’s plans. The individual a far-person is today has few
if any conscious psychological connections with the individual they were
yesterday or will be when they next awake.
Before we proceed I must clarify an important issue. Far-persons are
not non-persons.4 Non-persons are nonconscious organisms whose
4 I depart here from the way Varner uses this term. He uses “non-persons” to describe any
individual who is not a person. I use it, instead, to refer more narrowly to that set of sentient






































autonomic systems maintain homeostasis and respond to environ-
mental changes by moving toward attractive stimuli and away from
aversive stimuli. Non-persons may be sentient but their lack of
consciousness means that their pains and pleasures are not accessible
to them. There is, in short, no “them” there, as it were, no central
information gathering and processing system to integrate across time
the organism’s mental states, if it has any. Non-persons, as I say,
may or may not be sentient, but they utterly lack concepts, words,
beliefs, desires, and emotions. Their ability to respond to environ-
mental signals is to be explained as blind movement determined by
physical forces. Humans who exist from birth to death in perma-
nently vegetative states are non-persons for, apart from their physical
resemblance to us, they are not recognizable as the kind of beings we
are.
Allow me one example. JD was born in 1959 unable to swallow,
move, or vocalize. By her twenty-third birthday she had made no
progress. She lay in bed, permanently comatose until she died at age
27. She learned one lesson when the nurses who cared for her
decided to train her to signal them when she eliminated urine or
feces. Under their tutelage, JD “learned” to squeeze a button when
she was wet. Apart from this one accomplishment, however, JD
showed no signs of habituation, procedural memory, or short-term
desires. She never reached out to others, spoke, or held objects. She
did not swallow when prompted, cry when poked, or laugh when
tickled. She did not try to adjust herself in bed, turn away from light
or toward a voice. She did not try to make the room temperature
warmer or cooler. The nurses who trained her to signal them when
she needed changing did not regard her button-pushing movements
as conscious or intentional. Rather, they thought of them as
Pavlovian automatic reﬂexes, conditioned responses to a stimulus.
JD died in 1986 of complications related to pneumonia, never
having exhibited any of the most rudimentary signs of being a far-
person (Comstock, 2009, 2010). Apparently, human organisms can
exist for decades not only without becoming far-persons but without






































We must be very careful before deciding an individual is a non-
person for we know of many cases of persons unable to commu-
nicate or move because of physical limitations. In cases involving
neurological damage, such as “locked-in” syndrome and amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis, persons are unable to let others know they are
psychologically intact. These cases are not the cases I have in mind
when referring to non-persons.
Far-persons, as I say, are neither merely sentient nor non-persons.
They have beliefs and desires, and can act rationally. They under-
stand cause and eﬀect and can recognize faces. They have lyrical
experiences and temporal horizons, however minute. Table 3.1 sum-
marizes their relationship to persons, near-persons, and non-persons.
I turn now to a normative question.
3.7 What Is the Value of Lyrical Experience?
To answer this question let us brieﬂy survey three human cases that, I
suggest, are candidates for far-person status.
Brooke Greenberg was born in 1993 with an unknown neurological
condition diagnosed only as “Syndrome X.” She died at twenty years old,
never having weighed more than sixteen pounds or having attained the
mental capacities of more than a one-year-old (Walker, et al., 2009). The
seventeen-year-old Brooke recognized family members and demonstrated
object constancy by, for example, tracking the dress she preferred when her
mother would playfully hide it behind another dress. She enjoyed watching
television with her sisters, gave appropriate if child-like responses to their
simple commands and requests, and vocalized her displeasure at faces and
events that displeased her (Bethge, 2010). She produced few sounds, if any,
recognizable as words (Brown, 2009), but could vocally express to others
an emotional repertoire that included aﬀection, fear, and anger.
To try to understand how it feels to be a far-person, imaginatively
recreate the point of view of a one-year-old. Just now, for example, picture
Brooke trying to answer her mother’s question about which outﬁt she likes





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the objects, and her mother smiles at Brooke’s apparent choice. Brooke
in turn grins. I call attention to her smile, an intense lyrical expression of
contentment. The feeling is conﬁned to the moment, it is not available to
Brooke for reﬂection or revision, and minutes later Brooke will not
remember it. And yet, at the moment it is deeply pleasurable for her.
The second case is Susan Wiley, known in the literature as Genie, a girl
locked in her bedroom by her father from the time she was twenty months
old until she was freed at thirteen years of age. Let us try to go inside the
conﬁned girl’s head. She is, at the moment, responding to her brother,
whom she trusts. He has poked his head in her door because he has a new
toy for her. How does she feel? She recognizes her brother’s face and
distinguishes it both from her father’s face and from her mother’s face.
Her brother puts her at ease. She is able to track the hand that contains the
toy as he hides it playfully behind his back. It has been a few minutes. She
has heard her neighbor practicing piano, pleasant sounds that compete
with the songs of a waxwing that also waft through her open window. She
gives appropriate if child-like responses to her brother’s whispered assur-
ances that her having the toy will be ok with Father. Clearly she is capable
of fear, anxiety, anger, and aﬀection. She can understand that words
express speakers’ intentions and that words can be used pragmatically to
issue assertions, requests, promises, and warnings. When freed, she will
understand a dozen or so words (e.g., mother, father, door, bunny), and
react appropriately when they are used to refer to their objects. However,
she will only be able to generate and verbalize two ideas, each idea
pronounced as a single word, “/stäpit/” and “/nōmôr/.” She will not be
able to learn to use grammar to string words together into sentences, use
phrases recursively, or tell stories (Brown, 2009).
Forget all that. Just now, focus on Susan’s fascination with what her
brother produces from behind his back: her old familiar ragdoll in one
hand and, in the other, a shiny new yellow duck. Curious, she is reach-
ing eagerly for the unfamiliar object. She is smiling.
What is happening in this girl’s consciousness as she examines
each toy and turns away from the familiar one? She is having
implicit memories, conditioned responses or habituations activated






































(Tulving, 2002, 1984, 1983). She is not having an episodic memory,
explicit replaying a tape, as it were, in which she sees herself drag-
ging around the ragdoll yesterday. She does not watch any episodes
in her mind or place herself in the frame as the subject of experi-
ences who must choose between two objects. Her memories are not
indexed to speciﬁc place or time. And yet she smiles, and there is no
doubt she feels happy.
During the years spent in captivity, Susan Wiley lacked second-
order desires, the ability to form propositions, and the capacity to
understand or produce narratives. She did not use the ﬁrst-person
pronoun and, in the judgment of Susan Curtiss, a sympathetic
researcher who probably knew Susan Wiley better than anyone else,
Wiley probably did not have a concept of herself when she was found
(Curtiss, 1981, 1977; Fromkin, et al., 1974). After years of intensive
language therapy, Susan was able to use the pronoun “I” and engage in
simple conversational back-and-forth. Here is one of the conversations
Curtiss recorded:
(A = adult; G = Genie)
A: Do you want me to play the piano for you a little bit?
G: Long time.
A: How’s the neck?
G: Feel better.
A: I told you it would feel better when you got to school.
G: Hurt.
A: It hurts? I thought it felt better.
G: Little hurt.
A: How should I reach it?
G: Get ladder.
A: Why aren’t you singing?
G: Very sad.
A: Why are you feeling sad?
G: Lisa sick.







































A: How many sides does a circle have?
G: Round.
(Curtiss, 1981)
Notice that Susan’s responses are all one or two words, and always in
the present tense. Are her temporal horizons conﬁned to the “minute”
present? It would seem so. She is clearly aware of the passing of time,
and of the fact that time comes in units of variable length. If this were
not true we could not oﬀer a decent interpretation of her “long time”
response to the piano playing oﬀer. Nevertheless, there is no evidence
here of episodic memory or use of tenses. Whatever narrative structure
is present must be inferred from the context, context provided by the
questions proﬀered by Curtiss. Wiley has the ability to learn new words
and skills but she does not, for all we know, have episodic memories
she can manipulate that extend more than a few dozen minutes into
the past. Despite years of specialized therapy, she would never attain
the linguistic competence of a three-year-old, the kind of competence
required to begin narratively to constitute oneself.
We come now to a third case. Clive Wearing (born 1938) is a British
former choir director and pianist who, having contracted herpesviral
encephalitis in 1985, suﬀered profound declines in cognitive function.
Mr. Wearing retains procedural, implicit, memories for playing the
piano and singing. However, he lacks almost all episodic memories,
unable to remember his wife’s name or even the ﬂavor of the food he is
in the act of swallowing. He cannot consciously plan his behaviors for
more than a few seconds into the future nor remember what he is
thinking seconds prior to his being prompted. Suﬀering from total
anterograde and severe retrograde amnesia, Mr. Wearing lives, as
Oliver Sacks put it, entirely in the present (Sacks, 2007).
What does it feel like to be Brooke, Susan, or Clive Wearing? First, it
feels like something. Theirs are not mental states like JD’s which, to be
precise, are no mental states at all. Second, each individual faces diﬀerent
circumstances and no doubt has diﬀerent feelings from the other two.
We must be sensitive to these diﬀerences. Third, each one feels, at their






































when we are giddy to be alive, fully present and content in the moment.
They feel, at their worst, the way we feel when we are suicidally
depressed, desiring death now to whatever the future would bring were
we forced against our will to endure it. As Clive Wearing’s wife,
Deborah, puts it in her memoir:
It was as if every waking moment was the ﬁrst waking moment. Clive was
under the constant impression that he had just emerged from unconscious-
ness because he had no evidence in his own mind of ever being awake
before . . . “I haven’t heard anything, seen anything, touched anything,
smelled anything,” he would say. “It’s like being dead.” (Wearing, 2006)
Wearing’s memory, if we believe him, as I think we must, extends no
further than a minute or two into the past. He frequently reports
being in a living hell in which he has no memories at all, as if he has
just come out of a devastating coma.
On the other hand, far-persons feel at their best the immense satisfac-
tions of consuming a great meal or drowsing oﬀ into napping bliss. After
eating, if a far-person senses that a companion may be hungry, they may
communicate the location of food with warm, low pitched grunts.
Satiated, they may relay their sense of ease and contentment to familiars
by laying down, or making other invitational body movements, welcom-
ing trusted friendly faces to stretch out beside them.
I call these nonnarrative experiences lyrical because they do not
involve what Aristotle called the two central elements of narrative:
plot, the temporal arrangement of episodes, and character, the place of
personal agency in connecting the causes and eﬀects of actions (Aristotle,
1997). All of the value of lyrical experience is packed into the present
moment and none of it derives from the subject’s knowledge of the
distant past or anticipation of the distant future. Neither does it depend
on the subject’s being able to mind read. Since lyrical experience can be
intense, it can be fully informed by the immediate past and directive
with respect to the immediate future. Here is the way Oliver Sacks
describes the value of Clive Wearing’s music making. When Wearing
plays or sings, he “is not, in the usual sense, remembering at all . . . [he is]






































Lyrical experiences have natural sounds and scenes as their objects. In
such experiences, the present moment “ﬁlls consciousness entirely.” The
present, not joined to the distant past or future, has no characters in it,
no plot to it, and can be absolute bliss or pure terror.
Here are three humans who may be far-persons, sentient moral
patients with extremely attenuated temporal bounds, each living, as it
were, with a past of no more than a few hours and a future of no more
than a few dozen minutes. They have procedural memories encoded in
habits that allow them to follow familiar melodies and move their
bodies and ﬁngers in rhythm. Perhaps they will have a lucid, vibrant
musical experience in the morning in which they help to produce the
melodies using piano “know-how” skills. But the experiences will be
evanescent, not available to them for recall later that evening. Hours
later, they will not “know-that” they had the earlier pleasure, will not
be able to reﬂect upon their know-how or draw on their memory to
inspire them to try to plan a way to have similar experiences in the
future.
Far-person experience is lyrical but not autonoetic. While far-persons
are aware of pleasures and pains they cannot assess these experiences,
recognize that they have not had as many pleasurable musical experi-
ences as they would wish, or regret that the past week has been one of
unyielding anxiety. Neither can they form beliefs about, much less
speciﬁc plans for, the future in the hope, perhaps, that it will bring
stimulating days.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, there is no reason to think that
you and I have not had, or at least could have, lyrical experiences
that are exactly the same as the experiences of human far-persons.
Can we then claim that our lyrical experiences are exactly the same
as those of nonhuman far-persons? I can see no philosophical impe-
diment to our reaching this conclusion. So, how does Informed feel
when she evades her companion and buys herself a few moments of
solitude with her food? She feels exactly the same way Susan Wiley
might feel were she pursuing a similar goal: initial curiosity about
whether she can successfully deceive her companion, surprise upon
learning that she has achieved the ruse, peace upon her awareness






































when confronted with an animal whose face she does not recognize,
Informed may feel exactly the same sort of anxiety, fear, or anger
that Susan might feel under similar circumstances. Informed may
vocalize her displeasure, try to scare the stranger away with desperate
high pitched screams. Once either far-person has eaten her ﬁll, she
may enjoy communicating the location of the food to her mate with
low pitched warm grunts. After she has eaten her ﬁll, she may look
forward to lying down with her mate, making it clear that she
welcomes nuzzling and grooming. And she may envision herself,
dozens of seconds hence, stretched out beside a familiar.
3.8 The Moral Status of Far-Persons
When Jenny in the London zoo is getting herself under control and
beginning to look past her frustrations, she may well realize that she has
it within herself to stop crying. If she does, she exercises the same self-
control we praise in our two-year-olds. When Oreo is satisﬁed with the
shape of her nest in the barn and content that she has done what she can
with the design, she is enjoying the kind of pleasure we appreciate in
two-year-olds making forts out of blankets in the living room. When
Informed ﬁgures out that Uninformed is watching her and schemes to
mislead her, she is exhibiting the kind of cleverness and forethought we
admire in our pre-kindergarteners. When a calf skips down a chute
having improved the speed of her puzzle solving, she is showing a
satisfaction in her ability to learn that we hope to see in our toddlers
(Hagen & Broom, 2004).
To the extent that all lyrical experiences can be thought of as the
satisfactions of desires, they display a common trait. There is a phenom-
enal state the subject is in, that state is oriented toward the future, and
for the subject’s current desire to be satisﬁed, others must not interfere
with the subject. To the extent that these desires are harmless to
those potentially aﬀected by them, moral agents should adopt rules
that protect the individuals with these desires. In Hare’s and Varner’s






































deontological language of moral rights. As a negative right to liberty
entails as a condition of its satisfaction a negative right to life, far-persons
in two-level utilitarianism possess both a right to life and to freedom.
Exactly what scope and strength such rights have, and how and when
they may be over-ridden, is a complex matter for another day (see
McMahan, 2002; Singer, 1993; Varner, 2012, 1998).
We have no evidence to date that pigs have a robust autonoetic
consciousness. But we do have evidence that they are more than merely
sentient. Varner writes that “having autonoetic consciousness doesn’t give
one a biographical sense of self and make one a person, [and yet] good ILS
rules will incorporate some kind of special respect for near-persons”
(Varner, 2012). Similarly, having lyrical experiences doesn’t give one a
robust autonoetic sense of self and make one a near-person, and yet good
ILS rules will incorporate some kind of special consideration for far-
persons. Such special consideration must recognize that probably all mam-
mals are far-persons insofar as they are subjects of a life of lyrical experi-
ence. Because lyrical experiences are good in themselves, we should adopt
ILS rules that, all else equal, prohibit raising, killing, and eating mammals.
Such rules would also establish a strong presumption that, extraordinary
circumstances aside, harming mammals in scientiﬁc research is also ser-
iously wrong. The everyday rules must be formulated to help us form
habits of respect for quasi-persons’ ILS rights to life and liberty.
3.9 Conclusion
Darwin’s suggestion, that orangutans have minds like children’s minds,
may be true not only of the great apes but of all mammals. Pigs, for
example, use concepts, understand words, sulk, and respond emotionally
to admonishments. They can learn to deceive others, to defer acting on
their immediate desires, and form hypotheses that require several minutes
of sustained action to achieve the desired end. As a representative of the
class of nonprimate nonhuman mammals, pigs probably lack robust
autonoetic consciousness but this fact, if it is a fact, does not mean their






































pigs’ experiences seem exactly like at least some experiences of children.
Exactly like them because while it is true that pigs lack the potential to
develop into persons, children with radical congenital cognitive limita-
tions lack that potential, too. The purpose of this chapter has not been
to mount a full defense of this claim. It has been more modest, to extend
Darwin’s claim from the great apes to all mammals while providing
some evidence that all mammals are like humans in morally signiﬁcant
ways. I have argued that if we select the right target human experiences,
namely, the lyrical experiences of human far-persons, then some mental
states of some nonhuman mammals may be precisely like some of our
mental states.
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